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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to raise the level of discourse surrounding paradigms by drawing out a 
number of observations on how paradigms are interpreted in the IS field, and to reclaim the 
transformative potential of the Kuhnian paradigm concept in encouraging novel, interesting and 
relevant research and theorizing. After positioning the contribution of the Kuhnian paradigm and its 
significance in the philosophy of science, we describe the negative impacts of a research 
community’s preoccupation with the epistemological sense of paradigm, which ignited within the 
organizational sciences decades of unnecessary “paradigm wars” and a misplaced focus on 
methodology. We show how this epistemological rendering of paradigm, which is adopted by the IS 
field, differs from the opinions of well-known critics of Kuhn and how this view obscures the 
Kuhnian paradigm’s potential for innovative research. To provide valuable insights into these issues, 
we introduce Masterman’s interpretation of Kuhn’s model, which Kuhn himself endorses, and 
unpack the paradigm concept into its metaphysical, sociological and artifactual components. Using 
Masterman’s interpretation to highlight the primary meaning of Kuhn’s paradigm concept as model 
problem-solution and exemplar, we describe how this multifaceted transformative view of paradigm 
benefits the IS field. 
Keywords: Information Systems (IS) Theory, IS Philosophy, Creativity, IS Research Methods, 
Kuhn, Paradigm, Positivism, Interpretivism 
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1 Introduction 
The goal of this research perspective article is to raise 
the level of discourse surrounding the concept of 
paradigm in the information systems (IS) field and 
reclaim the transformative potential of the Kuhnian 
paradigm toward engendering more novel, interesting, 
and relevant research and theorizing. In the 
organizational sciences, Alvesson and Sandberg 
(2013b) place the blame for the lack of innovative and 
influential research in the management discipline on 
the dominance of “incremental gap-spotting research” 
(p. 128). Other organizational science scholars point to 
excessive borrowing (Oswick, Fleming & Hanlon, 
2011), and exclusionary polemical tendencies that 
favor specific types of positivist and functionalist 
research (Grey, 2010). Similar concerns, voicing the 
need to develop research that are more forward-
looking, influential and socially relevant, have also 
occupied the attention of IS scholars (Agarwal & 
Lucas Jr., 2005; Applegate, 1999; Benbasat & Zmud, 
1999; Grover, 2013; Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; 
Grover, Lyytinen, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2008; 
Hirschheim & Klein, 2003; Klein & Hirschheim, 
2008). These interlinked issues are all related to how 
research is undertaken and, in the most inclusive sense, 




concerns how certain approaches toward research 
dominate over others “to the detriment of intellectual 
innovation” (Grey, 2010, p. 128). In order to overcome 
these problems in the organizational sciences, 
Alvesson and Sandberg (2014, p. 967-969) propose 
moving away from “boxed-in” research toward “box-
breaking” and “box-transcending” research. 
We argue that one of the forces holding back “box-
breaking” research in IS can be traced to an 
overarching, “boxed-in” view of paradigms in IS as 
epistemological choices, which take both the 
organizational sciences and IS fields away from the 
Kuhnian paradigm’s transformative potential. This 
overarching epistemological view of the paradigm 
concept, which tends to be exclusionary, 
overemphasizes the paradigm’s metaphysical 
component, primarily its epistemological implications, 
over the paradigm’s sociological and conceptual 
components. Based on our analysis of paradigms, we 
recommend that the IS community abandon this 
practice of classifying, designing and evaluating 
research based primarily on its epistemology, and to 
adopt a more transformative interpretation of the 
paradigm that incorporates all of its metaphysical, 
sociological and conceptual components.  
The study proceeds in the following manner. First, we 
position Kuhn’s works and the significance of the 
paradigm concept within the history of the 
development of knowledge. We then trace the 
development of the paradigm concept and how it was 
appropriated by the sociological and organizational 
sciences in a primarily epistemological sense 
triggering unnecessary paradigm wars and holding 
back progress. We explain that this epistemological 
sense of the Kuhnian paradigm is only one part of a 
larger multifaceted picture of the paradigm. To 
reinstate the other components of the Kuhnian 
paradigm, we use Masterman’s analysis of Kuhn’s use 
of the term paradigm and subsequently highlight the 
paradigm’s transformative potential. In the second half 
of the paper, we call for a return to this transformative 
view of the paradigm and explain the benefits of 
guiding research using its metaphysical, sociological 
and conceptual senses rather than on its 
epistemological rendering. We conclude by arguing 
that the multifaceted Kuhnian paradigm is more 
capable of uncovering hidden assumptions, more 
inclusive of alternative views, and consequently 
engenders pluralism, innovation and creativity, 
contrary to the received view of the Kuhnian paradigm 
in IS. Notwithstanding all of these purported 
advantages, we emphasize that our research 
perspective is one of many possible directions by 
which IS research could be viewed and consequently 
enhanced, and we do not claim that it is either the 
primary nor the only way forward for the IS field.  
2 Kuhn’s Legacy and The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions  
We begin by emphasizing the critical role of the 
philosophy of science in enhancing research. The 
scope of the philosophy of science addresses not only 
the goals of research but also whether such research 
qualifies as being scientific, for it deals with what 
science is, how it works and the justifications through 
which we build our knowledge. Questions about what 
phenomena a discipline is actually studying; what 
theoretical foundations inform the discipline about its 
object of study; what relations these theoretical 
principles have with each other and theories in other 
domains; and what methods and values can be used to 
guide the research, are all philosophical questions that 
often become the object of heated debates amongst the 
members of any research community. 
One of the most influential philosophical treatises that 
addresses these concerns is Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (henceforth called Structure). 
Gutting (1980) wrote that Structure has had “a wider 
academic influence than any other single book of the 
last twenty years” (p. v). Twenty years later it was still 
the best-known academic book of the second half of 
the 20th century, translated into 20 languages and sold 
over a million copies (Fuller, 2000). On its 50th 
anniversary edition in 2012, it became one of the most 
cited books ever with over 80,000 citations and was 
reported by Scientific American as “one of the most 
influential 20th-century works of philosophy and 
history of science” (Stix, 2012). The concept of the 
“paradigm shift” that it popularized is the staple of 
boardroom discussions among top executives and the 
source of continuing debates among academics. Why 
does Structure bring about such a significant impact on 
the minds of scientists and academic discourse, and 
what implications does it have for the IS field? 
In light of the struggle in the IS field to find its 
identity, legitimacy, and relevance, Structure and 
the paradigm concept have critical roles to play. As 
the editor to the Atlantic once commented (Fallows, 
1993, cited in Fuller 2000, p.1): 
Its basic point is that people typically go for 
years and years believing one thing . . . 
despite mounting evidence to the contrary. 
Then all of a sudden, they notice the 
conflicting evidence, change their minds and 
wonder why they ever believed otherwise. 
Such is the case with the IS field. There may be certain 
beliefs and practices in the IS field that have become 
endemic and require major paradigm shifts in the 
minds and practices of its researchers. Such a shift is 
not likely to happen if the field misunderstands what 
paradigm shifts entail. If paradigm shifts in research 
implies shifting from say positivism to some other 





nonpositivist epistemology, then a paradigm shift is 
accomplished by merely introducing alternative 
research methods. As this study argues, paradigm 
shifts that result in extraordinary progress imply much 
more than epistemological viewpoints. The received 
view of the paradigm concept in IS needs to be 
revisited, and the paradigms’ other more potent 
components reintroduced, in order for a transformative 
understanding to be realized. 
At this stage, we reintroduce what Kuhn himself said 
about the nature of a paradigm, and as we shall see, his 
view was both multifaceted and also developmental. 
For Kuhn, paradigms are strongly related to what he 
called “normal science” (as opposed to “revolutionary 
science”). This normal, everyday work of scientists 
within a particular field goes on within a given and 
taken-for-granted background of assumptions about 
the field based on historical practice: 
By choosing it [“paradigms”], I mean to 
suggest that some accepted examples of actual 
scientific practice—examples which include 
law, theory, application, and instrumentation 
together—provide models from which spring 
particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10) 
This very early (within Structure) description of a 
paradigm is developed in many ways by others later 
on—Masterman (1970) found at least 21—but Kuhn 
himself, in the Postscript to Structure, seven years 
later, maintained there were two primary ones: 
in much of the book, the term ‘paradigm’ is 
used in two different senses. On the one hand, 
it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by the 
members of a given community. On the other, 
it denotes one sort of element in that 
constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions 
which, employed as models or examples, can 
replace explicit rules as a basis for the 
solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science. (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 175) 
We can see already that these ideas are much more 
related to practical examples and practices than to 
questions of epistemology or ontology. 
3 The Misappropriation of Kuhn’s 
Paradigm 
When Structure was first published, it caused an 
uproar within the scientific community, which alleged 
that his theories tarnished the nobility of the sciences. 
In response to his critics Kuhn (1970b) added a 1969 
postscript to the second edition to stress the primacy of 
the scientific community and its sociological role in the 
progress of sciences as well as to elaborate on the 
notion of the paradigm. Several years earlier, Kuhn 
defended Structure at a colloquium chaired by Karl 
Popper along with luminaries such as Stephen 
Toulmin, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend (Lakatos 
& Musgrave., 1970). In that colloquium, Popper 
(1970) suggested that Kuhn was a relativist, that his 
ideas dismiss the possibility of objective truth thereby 
prohibiting any challenges made to his claims. Lakatos 
(1970) objected to what he considered the irrational 
and dogmatic nature of the paradigm shift (citing the 
analogy of the shift to a religious conversion) and 
proposed supporting new theories that produce new 
facts that demonstrate the research has shown progress. 
Feyerabend (1970) was concerned about the 
prescriptive implications of Kuhn’s theory, including 
the alleged restrictive nature of the Kuhnian scientific 
enterprise that limits many theories to one and 
artificially create a normal science that has that single 
theory as its paradigm. We will show how a simplistic 
rendition of these sophisticated arguments taking the 
form of rigid-narrow (Kuhn) versus flexible-diverse 
(Feyerabend) thinking of research found its way into 
the organizational sciences and the IS field.  
A few years after the publication of Kuhn’s Structure, 
several sociologists began emphasizing the 
epistemological sense of the paradigm by describing 
their field as following either positivist or 
phenomenological paradigms (Walsh, 1972), while 
others demarcated three paradigms—nomological, 
interpretive, and critical (Sherman, 1974). Despite 
protests (Eckberg & Hill Jr., 1979) saying that these 
sociologists misunderstood, or perhaps even refused to 
accept, the central meaning of the Kuhnian paradigm, 
specific research epistemologies were labeled as 
paradigms, and studies on paradigms as 
epistemologies proliferated the social sciences. It 
seems that, “if Kuhn has been concerned to delimit the 
meaning of his key terms, others have been engaged in 
extending them” (Perry, 1977). 
IS researchers will be familiar with the terms used by 
these sociologists to describe paradigms because they 
refer to epistemological worldviews that the field had 
grappled with in its own history (Lee, 1991b; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). As Hirschheim and 
Klein (1989, p. 1201) note, citing Burrell and Morgan 
(1979), this meaning of paradigms as “meta-theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of science and society” is 
a much broader meaning than the one Kuhn (1970b, p. 
vii) intended by “universally recognized scientific 
achievements that for a time provide model problems 
and solutions to a community of practitioners.” In 
contrast to this misappropriation of paradigms, studies 
outside of IS and the organizational science continued 
to hold views that are faithful to Kuhn’s definition. For 
example, in the philosophy of science, Gutting (1980) 
describes paradigms as being “universally recognized 
scientific achievements” while Bloor (1976, p. 57) 
defines a paradigm as “an exemplary piece of scientific 




work which creates a research tradition within some 
specialized area of scientific activity.”  
By holding to an epistemological view of the 
paradigm, (1) the organizational sciences limit 
themselves to the few epistemological and 
methodological approaches underlying research, and 
(2) choosing an epistemology results in these 
“paradigms” becoming incommensurable (Hassard, 
1988; Jackson & Carter, 1991;1993; Willmott, 1993). 
This was very much the case with one of the original 
works within organizational science that proposed a 
framework of “paradigms”—Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. This book was written at a time when 
functionalism/positivism in the organizational sciences 
was dominant and other research philosophies were seen 
as invalid. Burrell and Morgan wanted to create a 
legitimate space for alternative philosophies and so 
argued that these philosophies were distinct paradigms, 
based on fundamental underlying philosophical 
assumptions—objectivism/subjectivism and 
regulation/change. This effort led to them to construct 
four “paradigms”: (1) functionalist, (2) interpretivist, 
(3) radical structuralism, and (4) radical humanism, 
and to argue that they were incommensurable as they 
were based on contradictory assumptions. 
Notwithstanding the admission by Burrell and Morgan 
(1979, p. 35-36) that they did not use Kuhn’s 
conception of paradigms as the basis of their work (see 
also Jackson and Carter’s (1991) defense of Burrell 
and Morgan), the implications are the same: the 
Kuhnian paradigm concept is appropriated in ways 
resulting in undue preeminence given to epistemology. 
Incommensurability then becomes absolute because 
divergent philosophies are, by definition, 
incommensurable. Instead of enriching the 
possibilities for research with the help of paradigms, 
research is guided by choosing from a handful of 
epistemological choices, which, in turn, spawned the 
argument for a need for pluralism in research. Banville 
and Landry (1989), reinforcing Kuhn’s critics 
(Chalmers, 1998; Popper, 1970; Toulmin, 1972; 
Whitley, 1984), argue that IS researchers should reject 
the Kuhnian model and abandon the paradigm concept, 
“as it rests upon assumptions of the Kuhnian model of 
science which imparts value to knowledge on the basis 
of the conformity of its methods and results to an 
explicit standard: physics” (p. 50). Surely they claim, a 
pluralistic field like MIS is not amenable to such a rigid 
notion of progress and it would cause a “break-up of the 
field into rather hermetic factions and the consequent 
loss of the creativity generated by exchanges about 
research topics and research methods” (p. 51).1 As a 
result, the IS field treated the paradigm concept as 
somewhat like an anathema. In the preface to Ein-Dor 
and Segev’s A Paradigm for Management Information 
Systems (1981), the authors write: 
It is with some trepidation that we adopted the 
use of the word “paradigm” to describe our 
work. . . . Our trepidations increased when 
one of our colleagues let it be known that he 
“wouldn’t be caught dead using the word”—
a reflection of the recent disrepute into which 
this word has fallen. (p. vii) 
Other studies in IS collectively reinforce similar 
interpretations that have since become the received 
view. 2  In contradiction to healthy pluralism, many 
scholars in IS agree that the “establishment of an MIS 
paradigm could actually restrict, rather than enhance, 
the progress of MIS as a scientific discipline” 
(Cushing, 1990, p. 48). These claims echo 
Feyerabend’s (1970) criticism of Kuhn saying that the 
Kuhnian model is monistic, a monolithic ideology that 
“restrict[s] criticism . . . reduce[s] the number of 
comprehensive theories to one . . . [and] has one theory 
as its paradigm” (p. 198). Consequently, the view that 
Kuhnian model is too restrictive, and hands over IS to 
the “rigor” and “objectivity” of a hard science like 
physics is repeatedly emphasized by many IS authors 
(Avison, 1997; Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1996; 
Jones, 1997; Khazanchi & Munkvold, 2000; Klein, 







                                                     
1 This allusion to research methods and epistemology would 
later develop a life of its own in the form of an overemphasis 
on methods. 
2 As the following passage argues, this received view may 
have been inspired by Feyerabend’s (1970) criticism of 
Kuhn. 






Table 1. Use of the Paradigm Term in IS Research 
Articles IS References to Paradigms 
Alavi and Carlson (1992) “the dominant positivist MIS research paradigm” (p. 57) 
Robey (1996) “Even the frequently-lamented domination of the positivist paradigm seems to have 
weakened . . . Thus, in their earlier assessment of articles in mainstream IS journals, 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) concluded that IS was dominated by positivist research 
and that interpretive studies and critical theory were underrepresented.” (p. 402) 
Mingers (2001) “Rather than advocating a single paradigm, be it interpretive or positivist” (p. 240); 
“Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) considered three broad research paradigms—positivist, 
interpretivist, and critical . . . it is commonly held that research methods are bound to 
particular paradigms” (p. 243) 
Mingers (2003) “Underlying paradigm: in general, research methods develop within a particular 
paradigm . . . there has been a tendency to link quantitative methods with a natural 
science (positivist) approach, and qualitative methods with a social science (interpretive) 
approach (p. 236) . . . only 15% of instances used ‘nontraditional’ methods.” (p. 248) 
Chen & Hirschheim (2004) “In summary, we suggest that the field has been dominated by the positivist paradigm, 
despite calls to the contrary.” (p. 197) 
Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala (2013) “there is limited research that has employed methodological pluralism in the IS 
literature. . . . Mixed methods research has been termed the third methodological 
movement (paradigm), with quantitative and qualitative methods representing the first 
and second movements (paradigms).” (p. 22) 
 
The connection between the claim that the Kuhnian 
paradigm is restrictive and the need for pluralism is 
supported by studies lamenting the lack of pluralism in 
IS research (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Mingers, 
2001; Mingers, 2003; Nissen, Klein, & Hirschheim, 
1991). If a paradigm is the epistemology, then surely 
selecting a single epistemology entails a lack of 
pluralism. It is this conflation between the paradigm 
and epistemology that has caused IS researchers to 
consider the paradigm concept a threat to pluralism. 
Empirical evidence that the IS field has given 
preeminence to the epistemological sense of the 
paradigm can be seen in the language discussing 
paradigms by its senior scholars (Table 1). This 
preeminence of epistemology has led to a number of 
problems within IS research. 
3.1 Paradigm Wars in Research 
Incommensurability between “paradigms” becomes 
absolute because divergent philosophies are, by 
definition, incommensurable. Instead of enriching the 
possibilities for research with the help of paradigms, 
research is guided by choosing from a handful of 
epistemological choices. Even “mixed methods” 
research is seen as a kind of research approach that 
“different (existing) paradigms [meaning 
epistemologies] are routinely combined” (Mingers, 
2001, p. 240). As a result, calls for pluralism are 
usually accompanied by recommendations to apply 
alternative epistemologies such as interpretive, critical, 
postmodern or other antipositivist approaches. This 
epistemological and methodological tussle assumed 
“paradigm incommensurability” and its logical 
conclusion—the “paradigm war” (Mingers, 2004). 
Part of the confusion over the distinction between 
different philosophical research methods stems from 
the emphasis placed on epistemological choices 
themselves, as the means of classifying, designing, and 
evaluating research, such that the philosophy and the 
method become surrogates for the content of the 
research. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy 
concerned with the theory of knowledge and how we 
acquire knowledge while ontology, a branch of 
metaphysics, concerns the nature of the world around 
us. “Positivism [is]: an epistemology which posits 
beliefs (emerging from the search for regularity and 
causal relationships) and scrutinizes them through 
empirical testing” (Hirschheim, 1985, p. 14). Certain 
epistemologies embrace specific ontological positions. 
Positivism embraces the ontological position of 
realism (Hirschheim, 1985) and is often associated 
with certain research methods, or procedures 
“associated with inferential statistics, hypothesis 
testing, mathematical analysis, and experimental and 
quasi-experimental design” (Lee, 1991b, p. 342). 
As Lee (1991b) notes, positivist and other 
nonpositivist epistemologies are not irreconcilable; in 
fact, “describing a paper as positivist tells us nothing 
about the type of method used (e.g. qualitative methods 
can be used for positivist research) or the type of 
explanation provided by the research” (Hovorka & 
Lee, 2010, p. 2). In other words, an overemphasis on 
the epistemology at best holds back and at worst harms 
the advance of research. Focusing on whether the 




research is positivist, interpretivist, or whatever else is 
convenient for methodological purposes, but it comes 
fraught with problems. Scholars in management and 
cross-cultural studies echo similar problems. Eckberg 
and Hill (1979) argue that the original function of the 
Kuhnian paradigm is to act as an exemplar for 
scientists to see their way in research on a concrete 
level, not as an abstract representation of beliefs, 
presuppositions or worldviews. Without a concrete 
exemplar, puzzle solving becomes problematic, let 
alone the task of building a revolution in thought 
and progressing research forward. 
3.2 Squeezing Out Innovative Views 
Peering only through these philosophical lenses 
prevents researchers from exploring alternative 
options. Willmott (1993) argues that the philosophical 
choices, as represented by Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
constrain the process of theory development because 
they restrict research within polarized mutually 
exclusive ways of seeing. They engender within the IS 
field, rather arbitrarily, that research has to be 
conducted within discrete “objective” or “subjective,” 
“regulated” or “radical” approaches. Agreeing with 
Willmott (1993), Deetz (1996) highlights how these 
limited choices constrain sociological inquiry and 
demonstrates the limitation in the case of 
postmodernism, which Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
framework ignores—not to mention other forms of 
inquiry such as feminism, queer studies, 
poststructuralism, practice theories and many others. 
Studies in cross-cultural education and management 
that favors pluralism and paradigm-crossing severely 
criticize Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) epistemological 
rendering of paradigms that creates “a structure of 
simplistic and ambiguous dimensionality where 
complex and diverse notions are forced into artificial 
and ill-fitting unity” (Greenfield & Ribbins, 1993, p. 
178). By launching the paradigm concept “into 
organization theory in the most un-Kuhnian manner 
. . . [it contradicts the very] transformational 
dynamic of paradigms put forward by Kuhn” (Lowe, 
Moore, & Carr, 2007, p. 238). 
An instance of this squeezing out of other 
epistemological approaches is demonstrated in the IS 
field with the case of critical research. For many years, 
the IFIP community promoted the critical IS research 
agenda (Kaplan, Truex, Wastell, Wood-Harper, & 
DeGross, 2004; Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). 
Nevertheless, critical research is generally ignored 
(Chen & Hirschheim, 2004), such that there exists “a 
widespread view that IS researchers face a 
methodological choice between positivism and 
interpretivism as the two fundamental ways of 
researching and understanding the world” (Richardson 
& Robinson, 2007, p. 252). The problem is, even if 
critical approaches in research take over from 
positivist or interpretive research, they will likely 
squeeze out those latter approaches too. Research 
therefore becomes less about the core concern of the 
study, and more of whether it is say, positivist or 
interpretive, quantitative or qualitative. 
Unconsciously, these epistemological 
considerations trump the goals of the research 
themselves resulting in a “boxed-in’ (Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2014) approach to research. 
3.3 Impoverishment from Reductionism 
The scripted manner of choosing the epistemological 
approach (e.g., positivist or interpretive) risks 
impoverishing research in IS. The danger comes from 
lumping together numerous rich and insightful views 
into a handful of epistemological perspectives. The 
preoccupation with epistemology leads to a form of 
reductionism that impoverishes both the paradigm as 
well as the epistemological or ontological view. For 
example, the positive philosophy of Comte (1830-
1842) is very different from functionalism of 
Durkheim (1951/1897), which is in turn different from 
that of Parsons (1949). Although their works are all 
labeled “positivist,” they differ in goals and core 
concerns, and more importantly, elements of these 
positivist philosophies can be found in antipositivist, 
postpositivist and qualitative approaches.  
For instance, concerns about reasonableness and 
empirical evidence are found in both positivistic 
thought (Von Mises, 1956) and in interpretivist 
(Dilthey, 1883/1989) approaches. Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown are criticized for their functionalism 
and positivism (Jarvie, 1969; O’Reilly, 2009) even 
though they are considered founders and scholars of 
ethnography and cultural anthropology, terms 
associated with qualitative research and interpretivism. 
The differences between Radcliffe-Brown’s (1940) 
approach to anthropology and that of Malinowski 
(1922) are lost when they are lumped together as 
positivists. The depth of any analysis is lost when all 
those rich perspectives are lumped into “paradigms,” 
generically called positivism or interpretivism. That is 
why Hirschheim and Klein (1989) deliberated on this 
loss in depth of analysis by extending Burrell and 
Morgan’s four paradigms for IS development. 
3.4 Obscuring Key Research Concerns 
The conflation of paradigm with epistemology 
obscures the core concerns of the research. Vaguely 
defined epistemologies such as positivism, 
interpretivism, and critical research do little to enhance 
the core concerns of the research itself. Productive 
research seldom begins with the epistemological 
consideration of whether the research should be 
positivist or interpretivist. The likes of Emile 
Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Bronisław 
Malinowski did not begin their research with these 





epistemological questions; instead, they worked on 
explaining the core concerns of their research—the 
occurrence of suicide, growth of capitalism, class 
conflict or universal culture—and as a result, applied a 
wide variety of theoretical strategies, some of them 
positivist, many of them interpretivist, and sometimes 
both at the same time. As Czarniawska (2013) notes, 
vaguely defined concepts, such as these 
epistemologies, obscure the empirical realities that 
these scholars study rather than illuminate them. In 
other words, there are no direct relationships 
between epistemology and research methods. 
Methods should be chosen not because of the 
assumed epistemology underlying the research, but 
because of the fit between the metaphysics of the 
object of study and methodological requirements. 
One example of how research concerns in IS can be 
obscured is the case of design science research (DSR). 
Walls, Widmeyer, & El Sawy (2004, pp. 55-56), in 
evaluating how design theories are being applied, find 
that most studies use design theories “as a cloak of 
theoretical legitimacy” or “as a common language and 
framework, at a superficial level, rather than in 
advancing theory,” while Gregor and Hevner (2013, p. 
338) see researchers experiencing “ongoing confusion 
and misunderstandings of DSR’s central ideas.” The 
reason for the problems design science is facing may 
be traced to a conflict within its epistemology. The 
DSR paradigm was constructed based on finding a 
bridge to the paradigm of the behavioral sciences 
(Hevner, et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Simon, 
1981; Walls, Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992) essentially 
“by engaging the complementary research cycle 
between design science and behavioral science” 
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004, p. 76-77), 
whereas the stated goal of DSR is to produce artifacts 
in the form of constructs, models, methods and 
instantiations (Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 
1995). We argue, because of this conflict between the 
epistemology of design science and its goals which are 
artifactual, the desired progress of DSR is held back. 
One of Iivari’s (2007) theses about the philosophy 
underlying DSR alludes to this conflict: “Design 
product and design process knowledge, as prescriptive 
knowledge, forms a knowledge area of its own and 
cannot be reduced to the descriptive knowledge of 
theories and empirical regularities” (p. 55). Instead of 
attempting to establish tortuous links within 
metaphysical paradigms, we argue that DSR stands to 
benefit more from exemplars in design theories 
(McPhee, 1996) and design-related fields such as 
architecture (Lee, 1991a; 2010). 
3.5 A Misplaced Focus on Methodology 
The reliance on the epistemological sense of the 
paradigm diverts the attention of the researcher from 
the “context of discovery” and limits the research to 
the “context of justification.” The appeal of the 
scripted research model that links epistemology to 
methods lies in its intuitiveness and simplicity; yet, it 
masks two faulty assumptions. First, within the context 
of justification, there is an implicit assumption about a 
direct relationship between philosophical approaches 
(e.g. positivism) and methods (e.g. field studies and 
questionnaires) (Mingers, 2001). This faulty 
assumption raises questions among researchers 
concerning methods. For example, why is it that case 
studies, which have traditionally been a qualitative 
method, can be considered a positivist method? How 
can field studies, which have traditionally been part of 
the positivist research methods, be suitable for 
interpretive studies (Klein & Myers, 1999)? What 
follows from the ensuing confusion is somewhat less 
than rigorous, resulting from the attempt to be both 
quantitative and qualitative (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Lee, 
1991b). Second, this scripted model does not require 
extensive study of the nature of object beings 
researched. Generally, positivist researchers adopt the 
indicator-latent variable approach and focus on 
identifying good indicators that feed into measurement 
and statistical models to derive conclusions (Goertz & 
Mahoney, 2012). The tendency then is to focus on 
operationalizing and analyzing datasets rather than on 
analyzing models, constructs, and concepts. Thus, when 
a PhD student is faced with a “positivist” study, there is 
an immediate connection to some specified set of 
methods that supposedly will reveal the answers to the 
research questions; or when faced with “qualitative” 
research, other methods apply. Roszak (1972) succinctly 
describes this overemphasis on method:  
The methodologies of a Max Weber or a Freud 
yield brilliant insights only in the hands of a 
Weber or a Freud; in the hands of lesser talents, 
they yield what may be less worth having than the 
blunders of a great mind. One might almost 
suspect that methodology is the preoccupation of 
mediocrity, the dullard’s great hope of equaling 
the achievements of the gifted.     (p. 202) 
Therefore, methodology becomes the façade for 
legitimacy and the crutch for validity, as if the statistics 
applied unquestionably made the results valid, or the 
coding method correctly categorized subjective norms. 
Ciborra (1998) says it best when contemplating the 
“crisis” in the IS field: “Hence, concern with method is 
probably one of the key features of our discipline, and 
possibly the true origin of its crisis” (p. 8, original 
emphasis). What is lost in blindly following the 
epistemologically guided method is the sense of 
discovery that can only come from a close examination 
of the object of study: a detailed inspection of the 
technology being applied, and the exciting creative 
thinking from which novel theories are spawned. 




3.6 Struggling with Cumulative Tradition 
The mistaken assumption that epistemologies are 
paradigms for researchers leaves these researchers in a 
situation where no paradigms can ever be challenged, 
since time and resource pressures maintain researchers 
in their different epistemological camps throughout 
their research careers. But as Kuhn (1970b) explains, 
the transition from normal science to extraordinary 
science takes place when anomalies and achievements 
in research causes paradigms to be abandoned by the 
community for other paradigms. Unfortunately, 
researchers who regularly apply and have invested 
their careers in, say, positivist approaches, cannot be 
expected to abandon their positivist methods. The 
same goes for interpretivist researchers. This creates a 
situation where novelty and progress in the form of 
paradigm shifts become unlikely. On the other hand, 
since paradigms are not merely epistemologies, a 
positivist or interpretivist researcher can be inspired by 
any paradigm or work on any novel theory that causes 
a new paradigm to emerge, without necessarily 
abandoning their positivist or interpretivist 
preferences. What leads to novel research is not 
choosing between philosophical approaches; it is the 
subsequent acquisition of new paradigms and 
subsequent dethronement of less productive ones. 
Research that allows the epistemological rendering of 
the paradigm to dominate is unlikely to witness any 
revolutions in their research, and therefore will see 
little progress or cumulative tradition. 
The transition from normal science to extraordinary 
science and the accumulation of knowledge often 
involves challenging the status quo. Merton (1968, p. 
30) describes this phenomenon as finding a balance 
between erudition—that is, being faithful to the status 
quo and demonstrating proper scholarly depth—and 
originality, that is, venturing beyond, and even 
“forgetting” the status quo in order to engender 
creativity in research. The extent to which IS 
researchers draw or escape from those same tired 
approaches determines the contemporaneity and 
cumulativeness of their research. Fields of studies 
like IS that have a proportionally larger frontier tend 
to be inspired by classic studies of reference 
disciplines more than contemporaneous studies 
resulting in IS researchers tending not to build upon 
the works of their colleagues (“eating our own 
dogfood” (Davenport & Markus, 1999, p. 22). 
Thus, the less IS researchers recycle paradigms from 
reference disciplines, and the more they build upon the 
immediate works of their colleagues, the more likely 
they will build cumulative tradition. It is important to 
be familiar with the classic paradigms because 
rereading them enriches the research. But rereading 
can take the form of excessive borrowing and 
unhealthy reverence for the original authors and their 
paradigms. In other words, originality requires a 
certain level of willingness to question original thought 
and even forget previous research. As Whitehead 
(1917, p. 115) observes: “A science which hesitates to 
forget its founders is lost.” 
4 Masterman’s Interpretation of 
the Paradigm Concept 
These misinterpretations of the Kuhnian paradigm 
warrant a reexamination of how paradigms are adopted 
and appropriated in the IS field because they have 
direct implications on existing and future research 
directions. As Kuhn had repeatedly emphasized in 
Structure and later writings, the difficulty of pinning 
down the exact meaning of the paradigm term should 
not diminish its usefulness as it is applied in different 
fields. The complex milieu of thinking surrounding the 
development of and reception to Structure was later 
published in a collection titled The Essential Tension, 
where Kuhn (1977) acknowledged the many 
interpretations and possible confusion and difficulties 
his writings might have produced. The received view 
of the monistic nature of the Kuhnian paradigm in the 
IS field is inconsistent with other well-known 
criticisms of Kuhn. Popper (1970), one of Kuhn’s most 
vocal opponents, considers Kuhn a “relativist” (despite 
Kuhn’s protests) for saying that different frameworks 
and worldviews can never be compared unless “we 
have agreed on fundamentals” (p. 56). This critique 
developed into the thesis of “incommensurability” 
(Shapere, 1971, p. 708) which was appropriated in 
divergent ways by different research communities. 
Relativism implies that many points of view are 
equally valid, suggesting that while Kuhn’s critics 
consider his model pluralistic, the received view in IS 
considers it monistic. The received view in IS also sees 
the Kuhnian model as physics-inspired, deterministic 
and epistemologically rational (Banville & Landry, 
1989; Whitley, 1984), devoid of sociological 
perspectives that are so crucial to a correct 
understanding of the progress of science. While his 
critics (Keat & Urry, 2010; Urry, 1973) acknowledge 
Kuhn’s sociological contributions and the 
sociologically irreducible nature of his model, Kuhn’s 
sociological perspective implies that even the most 
rigorous scientist is merely part of a community that is 
equally open to ideological strife and controversy. In 
fact, among the earliest to take advantage of the 
Kuhnian paradigm were the social sciences, which had 
struggled for decades under the hegemony of the 
positivist “hard sciences” (Fuller, 2000). 
Ironically, Kuhn himself had anticipated what became 
the received view of the paradigm in IS. With regard 
to the allegation that the paradigm concept engenders 
a monistic unified model, Kuhn (1970b) wrote: 
What has been said so far may have seemed 
to imply that normal science is a single 





monolithic and unified enterprise that must 
stand or fall with any one of its paradigms as 
well as with all of them together. But science 
is obviously seldom or never like that. (p. 49)  
And on the allegation that the Kuhnian paradigm 
forces the model of physics and the natural sciences on 
the social sciences, Kuhn (1970b, p. 160) anticipated 
how this model of progress could be misconstrued to 
favor certain disciplines like physics: 
Nowhere does this show more clearly than in 
the recurrent debates about whether one or 
another of the contemporary social sciences 
is really a science. . . . Men argue that 
psychology, for example, is a science because 
it possesses such and such characteristics. 
Others counter that those characteristics are 
either unnecessary or not sufficient to make a 
field a science. Often great energy is invested, 
great passion aroused, and the outsider is at 
a loss to know why. Can very much depend 
upon a definition of “science”? Can a 
definition tell a man whether he is a scientist 
or not? . . . Probably questions like the 
following are really being asked: Why does 
my field fail to move ahead in the way that, 
say, physics does? What changes in technique 
or method or ideology would enable it to do 
so? These are not, however, questions that 
could respond to an agreement on definition. 
(original emphasis in bold) 
As this passage explains, it was not Kuhn’s intent to 
impose a physics model on his own model nor will any 
definition of science be able to rescue any field 
concerned about its disciplinary problems. What does 
matter is whether or not the field has made progress, 
regardless of whether it is physics, psychology, the arts or 
philosophy. In fact, it was the social sciences that took 
advantage of the Kuhnian paradigm concept by quickly 
declaring respectability under the protection of their own 
unique paradigms (Fuller, 2000). As these evidences 
show, the simplistic received view of rigid-narrow-
Kuhnian paradigm versus let-the-many-flowers-bloom 
dichotomy of IS research is at best mistaken. 
Yet another, subtler, view of the paradigm in the IS 
field is the notion that a paradigm is something that is 
beyond the reach of any individual or group of 
researchers, that it is, in some exchanges among IS 
researchers, “impossible for a researcher to step 
outside his/her paradigm or invent a new paradigm.” 
Such a view mirrors Popper’s (1970) criticism of 
Kuhn surrounding incommensurability. Kuhn 
(1970a) acknowledges the “special difficulties about 
stepping into someone else’s framework,” (p. 232) 
but also stresses that “translation” (p. 268) is always 
possible. Also, Kuhn (1970b) extensively discusses 
the discovery and invention of theories, and how 
those inventions were “responsible for such 
paradigm shifts as the Copernican, Newtonian, 
chemical, and Einsteinian revolutions” (p. 66). 
We are not saying that paradigms are routinely 
shattered or invented by individuals or groups of 
researchers, nor are we disputing the underlying social 
processes that need to transpire for a paradigm to be 
accepted by the community. Cases like those of 
Copernicus, Newton, Thomas Young, Lavoisier, 
Einstein (Kuhn, 1970b), Mendel (Brannigan, 1979), 
Adam Smith, Ricardo, Keynes, Marx (Foucault, 1970) 
and others demonstrate, that individuals and groups of 
researchers can directly or indirectly cause the 
emergence of new paradigms. In the history of science, 
there is a certain pattern of discovery and of innovation 
that Kuhn has managed to distill, and that pattern or 
paradigm, can indeed be “used” or “applied.” For 
example, several studies describe how the paradigm is 
used as “a puzzle-solving device” (Masterman, 1970, 
p. 68), how “sociologists and their use of the paradigm 
concept” (Eckberg & Hill Jr., 1979, p. 929, emphasis 
added) transformed their field, and how the discipline 
of economics “attempts to apply Kuhn” (Blaug, 1975, 
p. 408, emphasis added). Closer to the IS field, Bell’s 
(1973) application of normal science in The Coming of 
the Post-Industrial Society (Fuller, 2000)—the classic 
text that brought ICT and the “information age” to the 
attention of the public—demonstrates how a new 
paradigm can be triggered by “an awareness of an 
anomaly” that challenges widely held assumptions 
(Slife & Williams, 1995) in technological change. Our 
point is that new paradigms become possible through 
many different complex processes, including efforts 
made by researchers themselves, through the weight of 
evidence, to convert the whole community to their 
point of view. This process by which paradigms 
emerge, which is rarely studied in the IS field, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
We are at the point where we can now define the 
Kuhnian paradigm and introduce one particular 
interpretation of it that is relevant to the concerns of 
the IS field. We define the Kuhnian paradigm as a 
shared exemplar for scientific practice, which 
communities of scientists and researchers agree in 
part or completely, that provide models from which 
coherent scientific traditions may emerge. Masterman 
(1970) was among the earliest to acknowledge the 
usefulness of this paradigm concept, especially as a 
guide which scientists were still able to use to perform 
their research in the period in which theories were 
absent (the preparadigm period). During this period, as 
Kuhn (1970b) describes it, most research communities 
within that preparadigmatic field is “forced to build his 
field anew from its foundations” (pp. 13-15) giving the 
examples of the physical optics and the 
electromagnetism communities, which took a long 
time to agree on their paradigms. While some fields 




build their foundations, other preparadigmatic fields, 
like the IS field, borrow their paradigms from other 
disciplines and draw their direction of research, with 
few modifications, from those paradigms. 
What transpires during this preparadigmatic period, as 
we can see in the IS field, is a situation where there is 
wide disagreement on fundamental issues and on the 
objects of study in the field, or at least in the objects 
that should be studied (Lee, 1999; 2010). The IS 
community disagrees on which theoretical principles 
are most relevant (Gray, 2003), and disagrees on 
whether the field has made any progress (Grover, 
Ayyagari, Gokhale, & Lim, 2006; Grover, Ayyagari, 
Gokhale, Lim, & Coffey, 2006; Wade, Biehl, & Kim, 
2006a; 2006b). As many scholars argue (Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2013a; Ravitch & Riggan, 2012; Rivard, 
2014; Slife & Williams, 1995), progress in any field is 
made when underlying assumptions are uncovered and 
challenged, and much of these assumptions take the 
form of paradigms that have far-reaching 
consequences. There have been numerous 
interpretations of the Kuhnian model; however, based 
on Kuhn’s own endorsement, we consider 
Masterman’s interpretation to be most useful for a 
multidisciplinary field like IS. In an interview, Kuhn 
fondly recalls the first time he heard of Masterman’s 
interpretation of the paradigm at the International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, “ my God, if 
I had talked for an hour and a half I might have gotten these 
all in [Masterman’s 21 different meanings of paradigms], 
or I might not have. But she’s got it right!” (Baltas, 
Gavroglu, & Kindi, 2000, p. 300). A return to Masterman’s 
interpretation of the Kuhnian paradigm concept offers 
valuable insights to these questions and issues. 
Kuhn’s critics, who selectively choose parts of 
evidence that only support their contention, often omit 
Masterman’s (1970) positive evaluations of the 
paradigm concept that form the bulk of her 
commentary on Kuhn’s work. Masterman (1970) 
elaborates favorably on the “originality of Kuhn’s 
sociological notion of a paradigm . . . paradigms as a 
puzzle-solving device . . . paradigm as a way of seeing” 
(p. 59). As Masterman (1970) puts it, “we are not going 
to be able to go back to where we were before Kuhn” 
(p. 87). After listing 21 different senses in which the 
term paradigm was used by Kuhn, she concludes that 
they can in fact be grouped into three main categories: 
(1) metaphysical paradigms or metaparadigms, (2) 
sociological paradigms, and (3) artifact or conceptual 
paradigms. These three ways of viewing the paradigm 
are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Masterman’s Categories of Kuhnian Paradigms 
Paradigms Definitions Examples of Paradigms in Kuhn’s Structure 
Metaphysical paradigms Beliefs, myths, speculations, ways of 
seeing, organizing principles, maps of 
reality 
Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, Descartes extreme skepticism, 
and the “lightning flash” that “inundates” 
a previously obscure puzzle 
Sociological paradigms Recognized achievements, political bases, 
grammatical usage, accepted judicial 
decision 
Benjamin Franklin’s “conservation of 
charges” achievements in corpuscular or 
wave optics, legal precedence 
Artifactual or conceptual paradigms Classical textbooks, standard illustrations 
and analogies, standard procedures, 
applications and techniques, standard 
tools 
Ptolemy’s Almagest and Newton’s 
Opticks, the standard procedures used 
prior to the discovery of oxygen, 
instrumentation and machine-factory 
tools 
Note: * Contrast Kuhn’s examples of paradigms with how the IS field applies this term in Table 1 
 
4.1 Metaphysical Paradigm 
The metaphysical paradigm highlights the 
philosophical component of the paradigm concept that 
operates throughout the entire discipline. The 
metaphysical senses of paradigm include sets of 
beliefs, myths, speculations, standards, ways of seeing, 
                                                     
3  Kuhn (1970b) did not use the term metaphysics in the 
pejorative sense and alluded to it again in his Postscript 
description of the disciplinary matrix: “Consider next a 
second type of component of the disciplinary matrix . . . said 
organizing principles that govern perception, a map or 
something that determines reality, which was partly 
described in the title to Structure’s tenth chapter as 
“changes of world view. 3  Masterman interprets 
Kuhn’s (1970b) references to “continual competition 
between a number of distinct views of nature . . . 
incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of 
in my original text under such rubrics as “metaphysical 
paradigms” or “the metaphysical parts of the paradigms” as 
“beliefs in particular models” (p. 184). 





practicing science in it” (p. 4), and “body of belief . . . 
externally supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic . 
. . [causing] different men confronting the same range 
of phenomena . . . [to] interpret them in different ways” 
(p. 17) as “an essential part of a philosophical 
paradigm” (p. 121), as this metaphysical paradigm. 
Specific historical examples of this usage given in 
Structure include: Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, beliefs about fundamental entities of the 
universe, Descartes extreme skepticism, and the 
“lightning flash” that comes to the scientists allowing 
them to see what was previously not seeing. Both 
Aristotelian dynamics and phlogistic chemistry 
assume certain metaphysics (or ontologies) regarding 
matter. The idea that certain substances are “heavier” 
than others and the notion of a “natural” downward 
motion are ontological doctrines presupposed in those 
paradigms, and these doctrines determine possible ways 
in which puzzles about nature can be investigated. 
Descartes’s skepticism is a paradigm that assumes an 
ontology of knowledge that is certain (scientia) or less 
so (persuasio), and an epistemology that certain 
knowledge can be achieved by removing doubt. Finally, 
the “lightning flash” that comes to the scientists is 
analogous to the “gestalt switch”: a different way of 
seeing that is necessary before a scientist can reorganize 
the reality of the research anew. 
An important distinction needs to be made here 
between what Kuhn refers to as “ways of seeing the 
world”—the metaphysics—“and of practicing science 
in it”—the epistemology. Like in the case of Descartes, 
a certain metaphysical and ontological view of nature, 
may lead some to conclude with certain ways of 
knowing (the removing of doubt or Descartes’s 
dualism) and epistemologies; but, as we argue, the 
relationship between metaphysics, epistemology, and 
related research methods in the IS field is not as clear. 
Metaphysical assumptions do tend to be exclusionary 
since they usually relate to the discipline as a whole 
rather than a specific practice or agreement among 
scientists concerning their research. For example, 
phlogistic chemistry implies a certain metaphysical 
characteristic of the nature of chemistry as a discipline, 
preferring specific epistemological views, pushing 
aside other views that the discipline might adopt.  
These examples illustrate a subtle distinction that is 
missed in IS circles when talking about paradigms. A 
comparison of how the IS field uses the paradigm 
concept in Table 1 with the Kuhnian paradigms in 
Table 2 demonstrates the difference between the 
paradigm itself and the philosophy underlying the 
paradigm. For example, Aristotelian dynamics is the 
paradigm, whereas Aristotelian metaphysics, that is, 
the “essences of material bodies” (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 
104), underlie it. And as we showed earlier, it is the 
conflation of paradigm with philosophy that became 
the source of confusion among researchers in IS. In the 
IS field, metaphysical paradigms mistakenly take the 
form of epistemology or the theory of knowledge, as in 
the case of whether or not an external, independent world 
exists. Thus, following Chua (1986), Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991) categorize IS research epistemologies 
into positivist, interpretive, or critical paradigms. 
4.2 Sociological Paradigm 
Instead of belief systems that operate throughout the 
entire discipline, Masterman’s sociological senses of 
the paradigm allude to different multifaceted sources 
of influences within the scientific community. 
Sociological paradigms can take the shape of 
contrasting forces as different as scientific 
achievements, sociological bases that hold a political 
institution together, accepted judicial decisions or 
grammatical usage. Thus, the examples of sociological 
paradigms in Kuhn’s Structure point to the actual 
practices of the community, intellectually (scientific 
progress), politically (institutions), legally (judicial 
decisions) or linguistically (grammatical usage) 
(Masterman, 1970). These practices are recognized as 
the bases for future work. The concept of the sociological 
paradigm was reemphasized by Kuhn himself in his 
response to his critics (in his 1969 postscript) when he 
wrote about “the sociological” (Kuhn, 1907b, p. 175) 
“Scientific communities can and should be isolated without 
prior recourse to paradigms . . . by scrutinizing the behavior 
of a given community” (p. 176). 
In Structure, when a community of researchers rallied 
around Benjamin Franklin’s paradigm of 
“conservation of charges,” they based their research on 
the assumption that electricity is never created but 
“collected.” This social construction bounded early 
researchers of electricity into a distinguishable 
scientific community, ironically called the 
“electricians” (Kuhn, 1970b). This sociological 
paradigm is formalized as the law of conservation of 
charge, the principle behind many inventions and 
future progress in the study of electricity. Unlike the 
earlier metaphysical paradigms, the “conservation of 
charges” paradigm does not lend itself toward 
characterizing the nature of the whole discipline of 
physics; instead, it forms the basis for specialization 
within the discipline for many researchers over a long 
period of time. The same sense of the paradigm can be 
seen in the achievements surrounding the different 
research communities ascribing to the corpuscular 
theory or wave theory of light in physics. During 
Newton’s time, it was the community that subscribed 
to the corpuscular paradigm that held sway, even 
though a smaller community of researchers that held 
the view of light being a wave phenomenon existed at 
the same time. Such paradigms are not limited to 
scientific discoveries. Judicial decisions taking the 
form of legal precedence in common law sets a 
standard for future decisions, which is a sociological 




paradigm that ensures consistent treatment for future 
legal cases. Research following sociological 
paradigms is not uncommon in IS; for example, 
historically, IS research adopted several sociological 
paradigms from other disciplines in the past including 
the decision-making paradigm, information processing 
paradigm, and the strategic management paradigm, all 
which dominated research in IS for many years. 
4.3 Conceptual and Artifactual Paradigm 
Masterman’s third sense of the paradigm term is the 
conceptual or artifactual paradigm, its most concrete 
component. It is considered both conceptual and 
artifactual since in many cases paradigmatic concepts 
take the form of artifacts in the shape of tools and 
instruments. Kuhn (1970b) refers often to how 
paradigms offer “conceptual and instrumental tools” 
(p. 37) and even describes how certain tools (e.g. 
weighing tools) insulate or distract scientists from 
solutions. Examples of conceptual and artifactual 
paradigms provided in Structure include classical 
works that expound the general body of theory, usually 
in the form of textbooks of the field (e.g. Ptolemy’s 
Almagest and Newton’s Opticks); the standard 
procedures used for the discovery of elements; 
instrumentation and machine-factory tools. In this 
sense, the paradigm becomes like a tool or apparatus 
for problem solving. The common threads that bind 
all of these different artifactual paradigms are their 
shared nature, the agreement required for their 
adoption and application, the commitment shown to 
them by the community, often their obscurity, and 
their temporality (Masterman, 1970). 
It is tempting to view artifactual paradigms as physical 
objects that are merely applied in research. What 
makes these concrete objects paradigms has to do with 
the knowledge embedded in them as a result of years 
of efforts and discoveries, the metaphysics assumed for 
the objects they are studying, and subsequent 
agreement of the community of scientists responsible 
for those discoveries. An example of a paradigmatic 
tool is the instrument used for X-ray crystallography, 
which became the critical tool of discovery of the 
double helix shape of DNA (Garfield, Sher, & Torpie, 
1964). Among the most famous example of a 
technique as an artifactual paradigm is Lowry, 
Rosebrough, Farr, & Randall’s, (1951) technique for 
determining the quantity of protein in a cell in 
biochemistry which fetched over 300,000 citations. In 
IS several artifactual paradigms exist, for example, the 
decision support systems paradigm that became the 
basis for much research progress in IS. A more recent 
example of artifactual paradigms are the Internet 
search technologies that are made famous by 
companies such as Yahoo and Google. The early 
paradigm of searching involved the user finding things 
on the Internet since no one knew what was out there. 
Now that we know roughly what’s out there, 
companies like Amazon are applying a different 
paradigm of searching—a discovery-based search 
where the things find us—as in Amazon’s “people who 
bought your product also bought . . .” (Battelle, 2005). 
Conceptual paradigms in the form of textbooks are not 
as common in the IS field. Although the IS field had 
adopted a classic text in the past (Davis & Olson, 
1985), there are no set of classic textbooks on IS that 
command the same stature as the classics in biology, 
chemistry, or sociology. Also, there are no standard 
procedures or techniques that can be considered IS-
specific. The quest in defining the “IT artifact” 
(Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Weber, 2003) may be 
viewed as a search for these kinds of paradigms in IS. 
Masterman’s (1970) interpretation of the Kuhnian 
paradigm highlights the common thread between 
them—the practical more so than the philosophical 
elements of scientific practice. In fact, Masterman 
(1970) opined that Kuhn’s paradigm is the practical 
rather than its metaphysical sense (“Philosophically 
speaking, a paradigm is an artifact which can be used 
as a puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world-
view”, p. 68), for “only with an artifact can you solve 
puzzles!” (p. 70, original emphasis). This more 
practical view of the Kuhnian paradigm can be clearly 
seen in Kuhn’s elaboration of his conception of the 
paradigm in the postscript to Structure (Kuhn, 1970b) 
and in a later book—The Essential Tension (Kuhn, 
1977). He accepted that he had indeed been somewhat 
profligate in his usage of the term and suggested that 
there were two primary senses of the term, a general 
one and a specific one. The general one is “what the 
members of a scientific community, and they alone, 
share. Conversely, it is their possession of a common 
paradigm that constitutes a scientific community” 
(Kuhn, 1977, p. 294). To avoid confusion, he 
suggested using a more specific term, the “disciplinary 
matrix”—disciplinary because it is shared within a 
discipline, and matrix because it consists of several 
practical components. The components are: 
4.3.1 Symbolic Generalizations 
Symbolic generalizations, i.e., formal expressions 
carrying logical declarations in propositional form that 
are shared unquestioningly by the community. Kuhn’s 
examples were scientific formulas expressed in 
symbols (e.g. f=ma) or words (“action is equal to 
reaction”), as he wrote mostly using examples from the 
natural sciences. The significance of these symbolic 
generalizations lay in enabling researchers to attach 
powerful logical and mathematical manipulations in 
their puzzle-solving efforts, their ability to explain the 
behavior associated with those symbols as well as 
simultaneously ascribing community-wide definitions 
to the symbols. Much of these symbolic 
generalizations are found in the natural and positive 





sciences (e.g. Nobel Prize winning Black-Scholes 
option pricing formula). An example that’s applied in 
the IS field is Codd’s (1970) database normal forms as 
the engineering paradigm for databases.  
4.3.2 Models 
Models, i.e., specific analogies or even ontologies that 
the group shares about its objects of study. For 
example, in IS, the classic Gorry and Scott Morton’s 
(1971) conception of “structured decisions” vs. 
“unstructured decisions” and their relationships 
inspired from Simon’s (1960) rational decision making 
model, was influential within the IS community toward 
understanding decision making. Kenneth Boulding’s 
(1955) classic hierarchy of information consisting of 
data, information and knowledge, forms an accepted 
model and paradigm for understanding information. 
Keil’s (2000; 1999) work on “project escalation” and 
“runaway systems” uses the ladder metaphor to 
describe increasing levels of intensity of a problem, 
and the “runaway train” metaphor to describe systems 
that are hurtling out of control. 
4.3.3 Values 
Values, the “third sort of element in the disciplinary 
matrix” (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 184) concerns subjective 
judgment of the community about their research 
methods, how theories are evaluated, and the goals of 
science. These values may be applied in different ways 
within the community, but they ultimately chart the 
field’s direction. During the early history of IS when 
influential members of the IS field were inducted from 
diverse backgrounds, Farhoomand (1987) thought it 
would take time for the field to arrive at a consensus 
on its set of values. More recent evidence suggests that 
the IS field had quickly showed preference for 
quantitative and statistical-type research for 
publications as evidence of rigor and predictive 
accuracy (Becker & Niehaves, 2007; Chen & 
Hirschheim, 2004; Hirschheim & Klein, 2012). 
4.3.4 Exemplars  
In his Postscript to Structure, Kuhn emphasizes that 
the “fourth sort of element,” also the “most novel and 
least understood aspect of the book” (p. 187) is the 
paradigm as exemplar. Kuhn (1977) says it was this 
sense, in the form of examples of successful practice 
that a community shared, that inspired his original idea 
for paradigms (p. 318). As he puts it, “exemplars, 
finally, are concrete problem solutions, accepted by the 
group as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic” (p. 298). 
Unfortunately, he let the term expand to include all the 
other forms of group commitment. Exemplars as 
concrete solutions to particular problems (or as Kuhn 
refer to as “concrete problem solutions”) serve as the 
basis for solving other problems by providing an 
analogy or metaphor for the puzzle. These concrete 
problem solutions can come from the community in the 
form of established paradigms or from creative 
individuals who undertake research that challenges 
existing paradigms, or invent theories that contribute 
to the emergence of a new paradigm for the field. For 
example, Mendel’s (1865) new paradigm for biology 
came from experiments that he individually performed 
without any community support. In fact the community 
of biologists took nearly half of century to accept his 
new paradigm (Brannigan, 1979). 
A classic IS example of an artifactual paradigm is the 
decision support systems (DSS) (Alter, 1977; Keen, 
1987), which for decades provided solutions to 
decision making problems at different levels and 
different domains within the organization (Keen, 
1981;1987;1991; Keen & Scott Morton, 1978). 
Despite deriving its inspiration from outside the field 
(the organizational sciences and their decision-making 
paradigm), this concrete scientific problem-solution or 
exemplar became the inspiration for other productive 
developments within the IS field including the classic 
research program of group decision support systems 
(GDSS) (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987; Watson, 
DeSanctis, & Poole, 1988) and the very lucrative 
executive information systems (EIS) applications 
(Rockart & DeLong, 1988; Watson, et al., 1991). To 
highlight the differences between adopting 
epistemology as paradigms, and examples of 
sociological and artifactual/conceptual paradigms, we 













Table 3. Examples of Paradigms in IS 
Example IS Paradigm Paradigm Category Notes and Major References 
Decision making 
(psychology) 
Sociological A psychological paradigm that focus on computers as enabling 
decision making processes. It is among the earliest paradigms 
adopted by the IS field (Gorry & Scott Morton, 1971; Mason & 
Mitroff, 1973) and carried IS research for over three decades (Keen, 
1987) and was the basis for the DSS artifactual paradigm. 
Decision support 
systems 
Artifactual/conceptual Among the earliest applications that were researched. The 
Minnesota Experiments set the standard for experimental research in 
the IS field based on an IT artifact (Alter, 1977; DeSanctis & 






Drawing from Chua (1986), Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) adopt 
these paradigms for IS research and has become the received view 
of the choices for research paradigms in IS 
Social-psychology 
(instance of the 
behavioral paradigm) 
Sociological Davis’s (1989) influential work on technology acceptance model 
(TAM) applies social-psychology principles for technology adoption 
Functionalism Metaphysical and 
epistemological 
Hirschheim et al. (1995, p. 9) “adopt a paradigmatic assumption 
analysis following the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979)” for IS 
development. Functionalism is considered the most developed of the 
four Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) paradigms within IS. 
Information processing Sociological A cognitive paradigm that is based on human thinking and learning 
and became the basis for organization design (Galbraith, 1973; 
1977; Huber & McDaniel, 1986) and other research areas such as 
media richness and the IS success model. 
Strategic management Sociological Emerged from Porter’s strategic management studies and led 
research on the IS/IT as competitive weapon (Ives & Learmouth, 
1984; Parsons, 1983; Porter & Millar, 1985). 
Boulding’s hierarchy of 
information 
Artifactual/conceptual Boulding’s (1955) classic hierarchy of information consisting of 
data, information and knowledge, forms an accepted model and 
paradigm for understanding information. 
Keil’s project escalation Artifactual/conceptual Keil’s (1995; 1999) work on “project escalation” and “runaway 
systems” uses the ladder metaphor to describe increasing levels of 
intensity of a project undergoing crisis 
Behavioral science Metaphysical and 
epistemological 
Paradigm that seeks to develop and verify theories that explain or 
predict human or organizational behavior (Hevner et al., 2004) 
Design science Conflict between metaphysical 
and artifactual 
Paradigm that seeks to extend the boundaries of human and 
organizational capabilities by creating new and innovative artifacts 
(Hevner et al., 2004). 
 
The organizational sciences went through several 
paradigm battles as can be seen in Donaldson’s (1985) 
defense of traditional, positivist theories of 
management: “Sociological discourse has come often 
to be preoccupied with the struggle between world-
views of structural-functionalism and conflict theory” 
(p. x). Sometimes the battles surrounding paradigms 
can be intense, as what happened between Pfeffer 
(1993; 1995) and Van Maanen (1995a; 1995b) on 
the need for pluralism in management. No less 
intense was the battle between the defenders of the 
incommensurability thesis of paradigms (Jackson & 
Carter, 1991; 1993), and those who find no issue of 
“paradigm” (meaning epistemological) interplay 
and integrated theoretical development across 
different epistemological sense of paradigms (Gioia 
& Pitre, 1990; Willmott, 1993). Notwithstanding the 
powerful arguments each side puts forward to 
support their respective positions, because both sides 
share the common epistemological interpretation of 
the Kuhnian paradigm, their proposals rarely go 
beyond between choosing or compromising on some 
kind of worldview and method. 
As one of the reference disciplines of IS (Culnan, 
1986; 1987; Davis & Olson, 1985), the organizational 
sciences exert a powerful influence on the IS field 
(Grover, et al., 2006b; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). 
Scholars from the IS field regularly publish in major 
journals in the organizational sciences and attend 





management conferences. This is not surprising 
considering the field’s origins and the name of the field 
itself—“Management Information Systems.” Perhaps 
because of the diversity of influences within IS, the IS 
field may have only experienced paradigm skirmishes 
rather than paradigm wars. Nevertheless, the 
hegemony of the epistemological sense of the 
paradigm was felt through the many years the IFIP 
community struggled to introduce the IS field to 
alternative epistemological and methodological 
approaches (Mumford, Hirschheim, Fitzgerald, & 
Wood-Harper, 1985; Nissen et al., 1991). 
Goles and Hirschheim (2000) suggest that the war may 
be over, and the field needs to be more pragmatic in 
order to reclaim the field’s practical relevance with 
practitioners. Mingers (2004) describes this experience 
as a 20-year battle between the imperialists, 
isolationists, and pluralists that is experiencing a 
ceasefire. Even though segments of the IS community 
embrace these alternative approaches, little change is 
seen in the majority of research undertaken in IS (Chen 
& Hirschheim, 2004). This purported lack of change 
may be symptomatic of not only a continued presence 
of the hegemony of positivism as the epistemological 
approach of choice, but also the inability of the field to 
escape the incommensurability gridlock produced by 
the conflation of paradigms with epistemology. A 
notable exception of the paradigm view is Dando and 
Bennett’s (1981) penetrative analysis of the crises that 
overtook the operational research (OR) field and how 
they prognosticated the closing down of OR departments 
in business schools across America. As Dando and 
Bennett’s analysis shows, a field that is faced with an 
either/or choice between a few discrete epistemological 
approaches is unlikely to invent novel and creative 
insights concerning its diverse phenomena of interest.
 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Critical research Constructivism 
Closed-ended epistemological choices in IS 
  
 
Open-ended paradigm shifts in economics 
Figure 1. Between Limited Philosophical Choices and Limitless Paradigm Shifts 
 
In response to allegations that the Kuhnian paradigm 
applies only to the natural sciences, we offer 
Foucault’s (1970) paradigmatic analysis of the 
discipline of economics, a social science. A 
comparison of the development of the discipline of 
economics with the IS field highlights the difference 
between limited epistemologies in IS with a discipline 
that is inspired by continuing series of paradigm shifts 
taking place about every 20-30 years (Figure 1). 
Foucault (1970)4 describes how different communities 
in economics each adopts different paradigms in their 
effort to theorize on economic value and prices, 
beginning with coinage, moving on to mercantilism 
                                                     
4 The depiction extends Foucault’s description by including 
Keynesian economics and monetarism as a continuation of 
economic theory. 
and labor to the more sophisticated factors of 
production, macroeconomics, and later monetarism. 
This depiction of the progress in economics shows how 
scholars of economics invent and construct different 
explanations and theories for economic phenomena, 
each enacting a different paradigm. This progress can 
be contrasted with research that is limited to 
epistemological categories. The categorization of IS 
research into a handful of methodological systems has 
become so deeply embedded in the discourse on IS 
research that they have become ideal types for research 
and are the subject of numerous articles and special 























important to note that we do not claim that the adoption 
of the epistemological sense of the paradigm is the sole 
cause that is holding back IS research. As mentioned 
earlier, research is a highly complex endeavor and 
many causal factors can simultaneously impact IS 
research. The epistemological sense of the paradigm 
encourages exclusionary polemical tendencies 
alongside other negative practices such as excessive 
borrowing, incremental gap-spotting research, and 
scripted approaches that engender “boxed-in” 
research (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014). 
Why then do researchers in the sociological and 
educational sciences, and our own IS field, tend to 
gravitate toward the epistemological sense of the 
paradigm to seek research ideas? Masterman (1970) 
says it is because these researchers do not take Kuhn’s 
account of normal science seriously. What she means 
by this is the tendency to depend on the 
epistemological so much that they have forgotten to 
allow for the material and practical, which is a large 
part of normal science, to guide the research. The 
nature of the scientific system as “a marriage between 
metaphysics and technology” (p. 71) has somewhat 
being passed over by a focus on the metaphysics alone, 
exemplified by a dependence on blind methods. Based 
on the necessity of the practical in inspiring new 
thinking in science, Masterman (1970) contends that it 
is in fact the conceptual and artifact sense that Kuhn 
meant in his paradigm concept. 
5 Benefits of the Transformative 
Paradigm 
The Kuhnian paradigm, when adopted in its 
transformative form, establishes the correct balance of 
metaphysical, sociological and artifactual components, 
encourages inclusion rather than exclusion, and 
engenders innovative research. The Kuhnian paradigm 
has already benefitted numerous disciplines, from 
some of which, ironically, the IS field itself derive 
inspiration. We’ve already noted earlier how Kuhn’s 
ideas inspired studies surrounding the information 
revolution. Berger and Luckmann (1966) credits Kuhn 
for inspiring their understanding of the social 
construction of reality. In sociology, Ritzer (1980) is 
indebted to Kuhn for his multiparadigm perspective of 
that field. In the cognitive sciences, De Mey (1982) 
titles his work The Cognitive Paradigm and elaborates 
on how paradigm detection studies “greatly contributes 
to our understanding of the social side of the paradigm 
concept” (p. 105). Kuhn’s Structure inspired top 
universities around the world including the University 
of California Berkeley and Cornell University to found 
policy-oriented programs that brought multiple 
perspectives from historians of science and 
philosophers to join their new Science and Technology 
Studies programs (Sismondo, 2003). 
Bloor (1997), in defending Kuhn against charges of 
relativism and pure idealism, states: “Perhaps the most 
shameful of all misunderstandings was the idea that, 
for Kuhn, science has no significant contact within 
independent reality” (p. 124). Political scientists, 
religious scholars and artists have all benefited from 
the Kuhnian model (Perry, 1977). Cognitive historian 
Edwin Boring (1964) analogizes Kuhn’s paradigm and 
incommensurability thesis to the notion of “cognitive 
dissonance” in cognitive psychology. Marvin Minsky 
(1975), among the pioneers of artificial intelligence, 
admits his debt to Kuhn for his frame theory and 
writes, “The basic frame idea itself is not particularly 
original—it is in the tradition of the ‘schema’ of 
Bartlett and the ‘paradigms’ of Kuhn” (p. 113). 
As a result of their preoccupation with epistemology, 
the organizational sciences fields have already suffered 
through unnecessary paradigm wars. The IS field has 
also undergone its own version of battles, and 
arguably, certain communities of IS researchers that 
favor specific philosophical approaches may still be at 
odds with other communities that favor different 
approaches. These “skirmishes” between opposing 
philosophies continue albeit in a language that does not 
directly mention paradigms or epistemologies (Mutch, 
2013; Scott & Orlikowski, 2013), but are nevertheless 
philosophical in nature. To prevent future gridlock, we 
recommend that the IS community abandon this 
practice of classifying, designing, and evaluating 
research based on epistemology, and adopt a more 
transformative interpretation of the paradigm that 
incorporates the metaphysical, sociological, and 
conceptual components. In addition to other examples 
earlier of how paradigm shifts have benefitted the IS 
field, we follow the development of social construction 
of technology (SCOT) studies, a source of inspiration 
for several IS studies (Davidson, 2002; Doherty, 
Coombs, & Loan-Clarke, 2006; Orlikowski, 1992; 
2000; Walsham, 1997) to illustrate the potential the 
Kuhnian paradigm for IS research. At the same time, 
we will refer to the development of several paradigms 
within the IS field itself. Although SCOT itself is not 
yet a paradigm within the IS field, it has triggered a 
paradigm shift within the field of science and 
technology studies. As Bijker (1995) explains the basis 
of his concept of the “technological frame,” he notes: 
“The analogy with Kuhn’s ‘paradigm,’ among other 
concepts, is obvious” (p. 123); “Technological frame 
is evidently one of the many children of Kuhn’s (1970) 
disciplinary matrix” (p. 126) much like Collins and 
Pinch’s (1982) “frame of meaning,” Constant’s (1980) 
“technological tradition,” Rosenberg’s (1976) “focusing 
devices,” Gutting’s (1980) “technological paradigm,” and 
Jenkins’s (1975) “technological mind-set.” In the 
following subsections, we describe the benefits of 
marshalling all the components of the Kuhnian paradigm, 
its metaphysical, sociological, and conceptual/artifactual 
components, using SCOT as an example. 
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5.1 Benefit #1: Engender Cumulative 
Tradition 
The Kuhnian paradigm contains built-in mechanisms that 
encourage cumulativeness. As Kuhn (1970b) states (p. 23): 
A paradigm is rarely an object for 
replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial 
decision in the common law, it is an object for 
further articulation and specification under 
new or more stringent conditions. 
Instead of replicating paradigms from reference 
disciplines, as can be seen in most research in IS 
(Grover & Lyytinen, 2015), a realization or discovery 
of alternative paradigms opens doors for IS researchers 
to build cumulative tradition and transition into 
extraordinary science. The first step in this direction 
starts with a recognition of the existing paradigms 
operating within the field. Opportunities for adding 
knowledge in the field can only be seen when the 
members of the field are cognizant of the underlying 
paradigms (Slife & Williams, 1995). Once the 
underlying paradigms are clear to researchers, work on 
alternative paradigms will not merely replicate the 
status quo; instead, it will articulate and specify new 
approaches that build cumulative tradition. 
Bijker’s (1995) work in developing the SCOT 
approach demonstrated the process of developing 
alternative paradigms to an existing mainstream 
paradigm within science and technology studies (STS). 
Up to the 1970s and 1980s, STS were concerned with 
the social impact of science and technology on society, 
a form of technological determinism (Bijker, 1995) 
that focused on their negative implications (e.g. 
nuclear arms proliferation, environmental 
degradation). In the mid-1980s, studies began 
suggesting a paradigm shift in the opposite direction 
toward the impact of society on technology—a 
technological paradigm. The existing paradigm of STS 
was considered inadequate in explaining the inherently 
social nature of technology (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 
1985; Winner, 1980). To explain this different 
paradigm in thinking about sociotechnical change, 
Bijker and colleagues (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; 
Pinch & Bijker, 1984) developed a new way of 
unpacking technology “to understand the relations 
between technology and society and to act on issues of 
sociotechnical change” (Bijker, 1995, p. 6). This approach 
involves focusing on the concrete problem-solution, 
uncovering the strategies taken by relevant social groups to 
resolve those problems, and the artifacts that emerge as a 
result of the inter- and intragroup relations. 
In the IS field, Doherty et al. (2006) demonstrate an 
example of this new approach, extending Orlikowski’s 
(1992) study of the role of interpretive flexibility, one 
of SCOT’s paradigmatic concepts. Doherty et al.’s 
case study focused on the problem of a nationwide 
implementation of a healthcare management system 
and how stakeholders interpreted that implementation 
in different ways (i.e., empowering versus controlling) 
causing various organizational conflicts. The results of 
the study showed how modifications are introduced and 
meanings get embedded into the design of the artifact as 
a result of the different interpretations in what Bijker 
(1995, p. 84) calls “closure” and “stabilization” of the 
technological artifact. This study demonstrates how 
uncovering the sociological and conceptual paradigms 
deliver new insights into the limits and opportunities of 
human choice and systems design. 
5.2 Benefit #2: Opening Space for 
Alternative Views 
Instead of the few mutually exclusive philosophical 
approaches that squeeze out innovative views, the 
more concrete version of the paradigm frees the IS 
field from the time-consuming and debilitating debates 
on whether the study is correctly monist or pluralist, 
positivist or interpretivist, idealist or critical realist, all 
of which tend to exclude opposing approaches and 
inflame unnecessary and unproductive 
intracommunity quarrels. With no epistemological 
doctrine to defend, the focus of the research returns to 
its core, channeling efforts toward progressing their 
research. As Maxwell (2013, p. 39) describes this work 
of theorizing, the research framework and the resulting 
paradigm, is like a “coat closet” allowing the 
researcher to hang different, seemingly unconnected 
ideas and concepts of a paradigm in a neatly organized 
and coherent fashion. Because a research community 
can rally around a paradigm that can be as simple as an 
instrument, space is opened up for a more elegant and 
parsimonious model instead of complex, unwieldy 
box-arrow diagrams. The presence of a paradigm does 
not mean that the research is entirely determined by 
any specific set of rules necessarily. The error in 
stating that paradigms rigidly determine a specific 
direction (Banville & Landry, 1989) assumes that 
researchers are somehow tied to certain rules. Kuhn 
(1970b) rejects this view by emphasizing shared 
paradigms, not shared rules, as a source of coherence for 
normal research. This “strong network of commitments—
conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological” 
define the shared paradigm that generates the rules, since in 
Kuhns words, “rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but 
paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules” 
(p. 42). Since philosophical approaches take a back seat to 
paradigms, the paradigm becomes capable of achieving a 
balance between the unified and the diverse, the monist and 
the pluralist, the critical realist and the idealist. 
As Smith (2006) notes, it is the “limited philosophical 
choices researchers have drawn from to represent 
causality that” sustains the unproductive debate about 
whether the social or technical is the cause. Opening 
up the issues of causality between technology and 
society to alternative views, both Bijker (1995, pp. 14-




15) and, Markus and Robey (1988) agree that the 
causal structure between technology and people is 
emergent, and to that Bijker (1995, pp. 14-15) adds; 
technology works not just because of any intrinsic 
property of the technology (i.e., the characteristics of 
the IT artifact become the explanans), rather why it 
works in a social setting requires explanation (i.e., the 
characteristics of the IT artifact become the 
explanandum). Thus, the success or failure of the IS 
are to be explained symmetrically using the same 
balanced framework, not tied to any metaphysical 
positivist or interpretive “paradigm” that views 
technological change as based on either determinism 
or volunteerism (Leonardi & Barley, 2010). The old 
paradigm might attribute success primarily to the 
quality of the system (Delone & McLean, 1992), or 
attribute failure primarily from not paying attention to 
social and behavioral issues (Lucas, 1975). The new 
paradigm, which includes sociological and artifactual 
concerns, allows the researcher to provide a more 
symmetrical explanation that focuses on the success of 
the technology as an achievement contingent on 
numerous different material, social, and political factors, 
all of which emergently explain both success or failure. 
5.3 Benefit #3: Enrich Theorizing Efforts 
Researching without clearly understanding the hidden 
assumptions and paradigms subjects the field to the 
dictates of specific reference disciplines. A field that 
depends blindly on the paradigms of its reference 
disciplines can never be expected to go beyond the 
limits and blinders imposed by those paradigms. 
Within the organizational sciences, Burns and 
Stalker’s (1961) integration of the organismic 
paradigm from biology into management to invent the 
concept of the organic versus mechanistic 
organizational structures is an example of an 
innovative use of paradigms. In this instance, the 
notion of organism in biology takes on a whole new 
paradigm that allowed the authors to theorize about the 
sources of innovation—a concept that is not strictly 
biological. Their adaptation was not guided by 
epistemological considerations. There was nothing 
positivist or interpretive in how they applied biological 
metaphors. In other words, the authors did not merely 
borrow from biology, they allowed the paradigms in 
biology to enrich their theorizing efforts. 
Unlike Burns and Stalker’s (1961) adaptation of 
biological paradigms, IS adopts its paradigms from the 
organizational sciences in a more wholesale fashion. 
This wholesale adoption can be seen in the history of 
the IS field beginning with the decision making 
paradigm of the early 1970s (Keen, 1987) to the 
strategic management (or competitive advantage) 
paradigm of the 1980s (Porter & Millar, 1985) and the 
business process (Davenport & Short, 1990) as well as 
the social-psychology paradigm (Davis, 1989) of the 
1990s. They were useful, allowed IS to leverage off 
studies from its reference disciplines, but essentially tie 
the IS field’s theorizing to those disciplines. Even if 
new concepts were invented in the process, those 
concepts are unlikely to go beyond the bounds of the 
organizational sciences. Instead of borrowing 
wholesale, a creative adaptation of those existing 
paradigms might allow IS researchers to found 
concepts, models, and theories that are not as bounded 
to their reference disciplines. For instance, instead of 
adopting parts of the paradigm from social psychology 
(Davis, 1989), an IS researcher interested in adoption 
or acceptance of technology can benefit from an 
adaptation of both social psychology and 
communications of innovation (Rogers, 1983), the 
latter of which is a communications theory for the 
diffusion of technology. By uncovering the 
metaphysical, sociological and artifactual components 
of these two paradigms, IS researchers can enrich their 
theorizing process for the acceptance of technology. 
The technological frame concept introduced by Bijker 
(1995) and Bijker et al. (1987) for analyzing 
technological change is an example of teasing out the 
metaphysical, sociological, and artifactual paradigms 
in order to enable productive adaptation. Bijker  
uncovers the underlying paradigm of technological 
phenomena by breaking them down into their 
components consisting of goals, key problems, 
problem-solving strategies, current theories, tacit 
knowledge, users’ practices, exemplary artifacts, and 
other artifactual models and analogies. Early 
applications of the frame concept in IS were limited to 
its more sociocognitive dimensions that focus on 
“differences in expectations, assumptions, or 
knowledge about some key aspects of the technology” 
(Orlikowski & Gash, 1994, p. 180), whereas Bijker’s 
technological frame includes all elements that 
influence interactions within relevant social groups 
and are “not governed by cognitive and social 
factors alone” (p. 124). By being open to a wider set 
of metaphysical, sociological and artifactual 
assumptions, IS researchers can enrich their 
theorizing efforts by adapting or inventing concepts 
that work for the IS context. 
5.4 Benefit #4: Focus on Core Concerns 
The Kuhnian paradigm positions the focus of the 
researcher on the core conceptual concerns, not on the 
epistemological or methodological concerns. A large 
part of the seeing the IS field’s own paradigms emerge 
lies in asking the right questions and returning to the 
context of discovery rather than testing foreign 
theories in the context of justification. The reason why 
new interdisciplinary fields like women’s studies were 
established was not because there were no concepts or 
theories about women. They were certainly addressed 
in other fields such as politics, psychology and 
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sociology and even biology. The reason why it was 
established, about the same time the IS field was 
established as a doctoral program, was because the right 
questions about women concerning gender issues, race, 
class, and sexuality in the multicultural context were not 
being asked by these other fields (Tobias, 1978). The focus 
shifts from methodological concerns to topical concerns, 
from justification to discovery. 
In the case of the IS field, there is much to be gained 
by going back to its core concerns, such as information, 
technology and systems, interrogating even the 
elements that seem trivial (Lee, 2010; McKinney & 
Yoos, 2010). Especially in an interdisciplinary field 
like IS that accepts input from numerous avenues, it is 
very likely that concepts from another discipline may 
be incorrectly used or at least limited by the confines 
of its originating discipline. Bijker’s (1995) SCOT 
approach offers novel ways of reexamining what these 
core concepts could mean to the IS field, especially 
IT’s emergent nature. For example, The SCOT 
approach places the focus of the study on the 
technology itself—the IT artifact—which has so far 
eluded IS researchers (Akhlaghpour, Wu, & Lapointe, 
2013; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Weber, 2003). The 
SCOT approach offers a way of unpacking both the 
social as well as the technical nature of technology. 
Recent efforts in IS suggest the plausibility of this 
novel approach. Using a similar approach, Iivari 
(2003) unpacks and positions IS as a category of the IT 
artifact. Riemer and Johnston (2014) apply practice 
theory and social construction to explore a nondualist 
view of IT as equipment. Answers to these questions 
that interrogate the roots of the IS field go a long way 
in ascertaining whether or not their application in the 
IS context is appropriate. 
5.5 Benefit#5: A Judicious Application of 
Methodology 
The intent of this essay is not to disparage research 
methodologies, or their underlying philosophies. The 
caveat placed on methodology is the preeminence 
given to it over the core concerns of the research 
resulting in research that appears “valid” or “rigorous” 
but always leaving readers with the uneasy feeling that 
the research is not getting to the heart of the matter 
(Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; Lee, Park & Gregor, 2014). 
By focusing less on its methods and more on the 
study’s core concerns, the researcher is more likely to 
get to the heart of the matter. Instead of depending on 
epistemology to provide the creative thinking in 
science, all three components, metaphysical, 
sociological, and conceptual together uncover a novel 
“way of seeing” (Masterman, 1970, p. 73) and those 
considerations in turn shape which methods work best. 
The question of finding a judicious application of 
methodology has concerned IS scholars as well as 
organizational science scholars for some time. As the 
organizational sciences realize that their paradigm 
wars and restrictive paradigmatic views of research 
were detrimental to theory building (Gioia & Pitre, 
1990), several multiparadigm approaches were 
proposed to address the gridlock (Willmott, 1993). 
Metatriangulation (Lewis & Grimes, 1999) uses 
paradigms as heuristics to help researchers explore 
theoretical complexity in the hopes of extending the 
scope, relevance, and creativity of organization theory. 
Multimethodology interventions in systems practices, 
especially if inspired from different paradigms 
(Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997), are claimed to better 
address the richness of the real world. 
Unfortunately, all these approaches stop short of 
addressing the preeminence given to epistemology. 
Following the organizational sciences, most of the 
discussions in the IS field revolve around finding a mix 
of the epistemology-method combinations that could 
“bypass” the incommensurability issue (Becker & 
Niehaves, 2007; Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Mingers, 
2001; Venkatesh et al., 2013). These proposed 
solutions preserve the problems discussed earlier 
concerning epistemology and overstate its 
importance. Although there is a close relationship 
between metaphysics of the object of study and the 
epistemology for researching it, there is no direct 
one-to-one relationship between metaphysical 
paradigms and research methods. 
In investigating the social construction of plastics, 
Bijker (1995) applied what might be called positivistic 
methods of analyzing the physical characteristics of 
various early versions of plastics, documenting the 
temperatures and chemical makeup of alternatives, but 
at the same time applied concepts of interpretive 
flexibility and technological frames to arrive at 
conclusions as to which chemical and heat-treatment 
combinations produced the dominant plastic form we 
use today. Hypothetically, the technological frame also 
could be applied in analyzing the perennial problems 
besetting IS development, where a large proportion of 
IS development projects continue to encounter some 
form of failure (Nelson, 2007). Analyzing all three 
paradigmatic components will provide researchers 
with “multiple perspectives, to move beyond narrow 
considerations” (Dwivedi et al., 2015, p. 143). Bijker’s 
(1995) technological frame concept offers an 
alternative way of using paradigms to study IS 
failures by structuring the interactions among the 
actors of each relevant social group (often called 
stakeholders in IS development studies). This new 
approach avoids studying failure merely from the 
technological imperative view of failure or the 
organizational imperative view (Leonardi & Barley, 
2008; Markus & Robey, 1988) As far as we know, 
such a rich perspective of IS development has not 
been taken up by IS researchers. 




6 Discussion: Disagreement on 
Paradigms within the IS Field 
The discussion on paradigms has been contentious and 
as a result the IS community holds differing conflicting 
views about paradigms. Some of Kuhn’s critics 
consider his views dogmatic and relativistic while 
others consider his model restrictive and monistic. The 
received view within the IS community views the 
paradigm concept as an anathema, and considers the 
Kuhnian paradigm unsuited for the pluralistic IS field. 
Some even see little relevance of paradigms for the IS 
field. In Table 4, we compare and contrast many of 
these conflicting assumptions that researchers may 
find discussed within IS circles. These assumptions or 
opinions may or may not be published and may be 
entirely anecdotal, but they represent the wide-ranging 
and conflicting views that beset the understanding of 
what paradigms mean to IS researchers. We therefore 
return to the goals of this paper mentioned in the 
introduction—to raise the level of discourse 
surrounding paradigms in the field toward engendering 
more novel, interesting, and relevant research and 
theorizing. We believe that by clarifying many sides of 
the debate surrounding the Kuhnian paradigm concept, 
the IS community will be better informed, be more 
able to uncover the hidden assumptions underlying 
their research, and be able to consider alternatives 
outside of their comfort zones. 
As Kuhn notes in Structure, paradigms can take the 
form of patterns, analogies, and metaphors applied by 
the researcher to see the “resemblance, grasp the 
analogy between two or more distinct problems” (p. 
189). They can also take the form of more concrete 
exemplars such as scientific achievements that have 
captured the imagination of the research community, 
best practices of either academic or professional 
experts, classic textbooks, or research studies that 
continue to inspire, and even take the form of IT 
artifacts or instruments that are adopted by specific 
communities. Thus, we argue for abandoning the 
practice of classifying, designing and evaluating 
research based on limited philosophical choices, 
specifically those modeled on the epistemological 
sense of the paradigm, and for the IS community to 
adopt a more transformative interpretation of the 
Kuhnian paradigm that incorporates all three 
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Table 4. Different Views of the Kuhnian Paradigm 
Theme Against Paradigms For Paradigms 
The importance 
and significance 
of the paradigm 
concept 
Whether or not the Kuhnian paradigm 
concept is correctly adopted is 
inconsequential to IS research. A study of 
the history or philosophy of science have 
little to do with how the field conducts its 
research. 
The philosophy of science addresses not only the goals of 
research but also what science is, how it works, how to conduct 
their research and the justifications through which we build our 
knowledge. The understanding of paradigms make up a major 
part of the philosophy of science and will have lasting 
implications on the progress of the IS field. 
Nature of the 
paradigm 
The Kuhnian paradigm is monistic, rigid and 
deterministic (Banville & Landry, 1989; 
Whitley, 1984). It hands over IS to the 
“rigor” and “objectivity” of a hard science 
like physics which is not suited for a 
pluralistic field like IS  
The Kuhnian paradigm concept freed the social sciences from 
the hegemony of the natural sciences (Fuller, 2000). His own 
critics consider him a relativist, not a monist (Popper, 1970; 
Shapere, 1971). The paradigm concept is a pluralist concept 
because Kuhn (1970b) states that “science is obviously seldom 







Is a theory or a model a paradigm? If so, 
why are not all theories and models (e.g. 
TAM, UTAUT, media synchronicity theory) 
paradigms? 
The theory or model plays a more specific role than a paradigm 
and can be a component of a paradigm. Thus, TAM and UTAUT 
is derived from the social-psychology paradigm that describes 
theories of attitude. Media synchronicity and the theory it sought 
to replace, media richness, are derived by combining a 





Positivism, interpretivism, postmodernism 
are paradigms. The Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) model of research describes the 
sociological paradigms of management. 
These philosophical approaches and worldviews of science are 
metaphysical aspects of the paradigm. They ignore the concrete 
problem-solutions that paradigms offer, limit the choices of 
paradigms (Deetz, 1996; Willmott, 1993) and misrepresent the 





The Kuhnian paradigm is rationalistic and 
ignores the sociological dimension of 
science and its nature as a social 
construction (Banville & Landry, 1989; 
Whitley, 1984) 
Kuhn was among the first to acknowledge the sociological 
dimensions of science (Keat & Urry, 2010; Urry, 1973). The 
Kuhnian paradigm is the basis of Merton’s sociological analysis 
of disciplines (Merton, 1973) 
Value of the 
paradigm 
The term “paradigm” has been abused and 
misused, and has fallen into disrepute so 
much so that it no longer holds any value 
(Banville & Landry, 1989; Ein-Dor & 
Segev, 1981) 
The paradigm term remains valuable. Numerous disciplines, 
especially the social sciences, have taken advantage the 
paradigm concept (e.g., Merton, Bloor, Berger and Luckmann, 
Ritzer, Bijker, De Mey, Boring and Minsky to name a few) 
Vague meaning 
of the paradigm 
term 
Masterman (1970) finds 21 meanings of the 
paradigm term and criticizes Kuhn (Banville 
& Landry, 1989; Whitley, 1984). Kuhn 
disagrees with Masterman’s assessment of 
the paradigm. 
Masterman agrees with and supports Kuhn. Masterman (1970) 
elaborates favorably on the originality of Kuhn’s paradigms. 
Kuhn acknowledges Masterman’s depiction of the paradigm: 
“she’s got it right!” (Baltas, et al., 2000, p. 300) 
Many different 
versions (earlier 
and later) of the 
paradigm 
Kuhn contradicted his own early 
conceptualization of the paradigm. In effect, 
he made a U-turn. His notion of the 
disciplinary matrix is a different concept 
from the paradigm. 
Kuhn refined his definition of the paradigm in response to 
criticism. The original sense of the paradigm did not change. For 
clarification, the disciplinary matrix breaks down the original 
concept into several perspectives which together still emphasize 





The locus of the paradigm is the community. 
There cannot be a paradigm without a 
community’s unanimous assent. No one has 
control of these macrosocial processes and 
therefore cannot individually or in a group 
establish a paradigm. 
There are many examples of paradigms in the sense of 
exemplars that existed before the community assented, e.g. 
Copernicus’s and Mendel’s paradigms to name a few and in the 
case when a paradigm is borrowed from other disciplines. 
Individual members or groups in a research community can play 
a major role in dethroning existing paradigms or establish a new 
paradigm by using the weight of evidence. 




Table 4. Different Views of the Kuhnian Paradigm 






A researcher cannot step out of his/her 
paradigm since a researcher’s paradigm is 
the implicit background of practice or of a 
worldview that the researcher is socialized 
into. A paradigm cannot be “used,” 
“applied,” or “extracted” either as a tool or a 
technique. 
Stepping out of an existing paradigm is what Kuhn refers to as a 
“paradigm shift.” Once identified, paradigms can be used and 
applied. Kuhn (1970b) specifically mentions and implies the 
“use” and application of paradigms (underlining added), for 
example: 
 
Symbolic expression—“In grammar, for example, ‘amo, amas, 
amat’ is a paradigm because it displays the pattern to be used in 
conjugating a large number of other Latin verbs.” (p. 23). 
 
Legal precedence—“[a paradigm is] like an accepted judicial 
decision in the common law, it is an object for further 
articulation and specification under new or more stringent 
conditions.” (p. 23) 
 
“was required in order to provide the special data that the 
concrete applications of Newton’s paradigm demanded.” (p. 31). 
 
Also see next row on “the tools a paradigm supplies.” 
Creation and 
invention of a 
paradigm 
Paradigms are not created or invented. It 
cannot be prescribed or dictated. The 
paradigm is a post hoc analysis of scientific 
practice that can only be identified in 
hindsight. It is not something that is likely to 
bring any change in scientific practices or 
conditions shaping those practices 
Scientists may not consciously set out to invent paradigms. 
Kuhn (1970b, p. 169) explains the paradigm as having “concrete 
problem solving ability” which, of course, like any problem-
solving method, can be invented. Some paradigms are identified 
in hindsight, but since paradigms are essentially social 
constructions, they can also be proactively worked on. We often 
come across the expression “need for a paradigm shift,” which 
represents a proactive effort to change the existing paradigm. In 
the words of Kuhn, encouraging the invention of new paradigms 
was among the goals of writing Structure: “invention of 
alternates [paradigms] is just what scientists seldom undertake. . 
.  So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove 
capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves 
fastest” (p. 76). (See also Kuhn’s title to “Chapter IX: . . . 
Necessity of Scientific Revolutions.”). Mason, McKenney, & 
Copeland (1997) cite Francis Bacon to show how a conscious 
effort in the study of history is capable of transforming and 
enhancing all forms of knowledge: Histories make men wise; 
poets, witty; the mathematics, subtle; natural philosophy, deep; 
moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend. 




Kuhn set out to write a commentary (he was 
an historian of science) of the progress of 
science, not to dictate or propose his own 
model for other scientists 
As a historian of science, what Kuhn (1970b) did was post hoc, 
by definition. And his analysis, judged by the reaction it 
received, had an impact and will continue to impact future 
research. As the aphorism goes “whoever does not learn from 
history is doomed to repeat it.” So, as both historian and 
philosopher of science, Kuhn’s writings and especially Structure 
are both commentaries and analyses of previous patterns of 
scientific progress as well as a proposal for future researchers. 
He begins his introduction to Structure by stating the need to 
move away from the linear incremental image of science toward 
his revolutionary view of science that will have “profound 
implications about its nature and development” (p. 1), and 
considers how such an historical study “can possibly effect the 








This paper seeks to illuminate an aspect of IS research 
that has become the received view within IS circles for 
many decades since the understanding of paradigms 
was first introduced to the field in the late 1980s—a 
distorted view of the paradigm as a monistic, rigid, 
restrictive one-dominant model of the natural sciences, 
unsuited for a pluralistic field like IS, and incapable of 
engendering disciplinary progress. This thinking, 
which found its way via the organizational sciences 
into the IS field, takes the shape of paradigms as 
epistemological and methodological worldviews, 
instead of shared exemplars of scientific achievements 
by the research community. The call for pluralism, 
which was offered as a solution to the alleged rigidity, 
involves applying alternative research methodologies 
or mixed methods. In the meantime, the transformative 
power of the paradigm concept with its exemplars, 
models, tools, and techniques that place focus on the 
core concerns of the research and help researchers 
solve problems and hasten progress, is left largely 
unexploited by IS researchers. 
To unearth these potential heuristic elements of the 
paradigm concept, we reintroduce Masterman’s 
interpretation of the paradigm as consisting of 
metaphysical, sociological, and artifactual/conceptual 
components. The metaphysical paradigm differs from 
the epistemology that IS researchers replace it with, 
and offers researchers numerous possible ontological 
views into the workings and mechanisms of their 
phenomenon of interest beyond just positivism, 
interpretivism, or critical research. The sociological 
paradigm abstracts the multifaceted sources of 
influences within the scientific community and inspires 
the future researcher using past scientific achievements, 
political attainments, legal precedence or linguistic 
nomenclature. The conceptual and artifactual paradigm 
offers paradigmatic applications, instruments and tools 
for problem solving, embedded knowledge from their 
practice, and examples of their accomplishments. 
These aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm highlight the 
more practical and heuristic nature of scientific 
practice and demands from the researcher, not a 
passive sterile compliance with research 
methodologies, but an active engagement into 
theorizing and solving problems with the help of 
paradigms as exemplars. These concrete exemplars 
embed decades of knowledge and effort on the part of 
their prognosticators, and become by their nature, 
paradigmatic. This transformative view of the 
Kuhnian paradigm is far removed from the receive 
view of paradigm in the IS field; it admits diversity in 
views, focuses on the core concerns of the research and 
the achievements of its scholars, and encourages 
creative, multifaceted research. This reinterpretation of 
the Kuhnian paradigm carries potential for a field with 
multiple specialty areas such as IS, each supported by 
its own history of research. Uncovering the hidden 
assumptions and Kuhnian paradigms behind the 
research allows the IS researcher to find alternatives to 
begin a new chapter that truly subscribes to the 
aphorism famously said by Newton “If I have seen 
further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.”
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